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831 
BIG DATA DISTORTIONS: EXPLORING THE LIMITS 
OF THE ABA LEATPR STANDARDS 
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON* 
Before moving on to my contribution about how the growing reliance on 
big data analytics may necessitate a slight modification to the ABA 
Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR 
Standards),1 I would like first to pay a few compliments to the drafters of 
the LEATPR Standards for producing such a systematic, thoughtful, and 
elegant framework for considering Fourth Amendment freedoms.  As 
anyone who writes about or teaches the Fourth Amendment knows, the 
doctrine remains a theoretical muddle.2  Yet, despite a minefield of 
conflicting precedent, the drafters of the LEATPR Standards have managed 
to construct a defensible and coherent structure on which to build third 
party protections.  I hope legislatures take note of the logic, scholarship, 
and wisdom of the committee in providing such a considered analysis of a 
complex problem.   
Introduction 
The value in “third party records” is information—masses of revealing 
information.3  This data can expose clues about individuals, groups, or 
patterns of criminal activity.4  This data can identify, link, and prove 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law at the University of the 
District of Columbia.  Thank you to Professor Stephen Henderson for inviting me to 
participate in the Oklahoma Law Review Symposium.   
 1. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD 
PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]. Individual standards will 
be referred to using the format ‘STANDARD x-x.’    
 2. See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution:  The Supreme Court, 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 6-7 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, An 
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479 
(2011). 
 3. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION 
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013). 
 4. See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT 
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 87 (2011), available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_inn
ovation; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All:  Privacy and User Control in the 
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013). 
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involvement in crime.5  Much of this data is personal:  involving 
information individuals may hope to keep private from law enforcement 
officials.6  As a result, individuals’ desire to keep this information private is 
often in conflict with law enforcement’s obligation to aggressively pursue 
investigations, which may include accessing personal data.  This tension 
between privacy and police investigation has been left unsatisfactorily 
resolved by the current Fourth Amendment doctrine.7  Thus, the American 
Bar Associations’ Standards for Criminal Justice proposed Law 
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) provide 
an alternative approach to balance the competing needs in this new world of 
available data. 
The question this article poses is how the LEATPR Standards can 
survive the impact of big data policing.8  Big data policing, as described 
here, involves utilizing vast, networked, commercial databases to 
investigate and also predict criminal activity.9  Big data policing involves 
the use of not just third party, but “fourth party” commercial aggregators10 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and 
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595-96 (2004); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s 
Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 
902 (2008) (“[P]rivate organizations can at times obtain and share information more easily 
and under fewer legal restrictions than the government can when it collects similar 
information on its own.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: 
Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2002) 
[hereinafter Access and Aggregation]. 
 7. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:  
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1349, 1383 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. 
L. REV. 311, 313-14 (2012); Kerr, supra note 2, at 480; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The 
Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo, A Blueprint for 
Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
1303, 1321-22 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002); James J. Tomkovicz, 
Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. 
L.J. 317, 438 (2002). 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-Parties to 
Launder Data About “The People”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 951-52. 
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as well as de-identified datasets, which eventually can be re-identified.11  
Without doubt, the LEATPR Standards acknowledge these issues, and 
arguably cover them.12 But as set forth in this article, big data distorts the 
traditional analysis and, thus, the LEATPR Standards may require a few 
modifications to be useful in the future.13   
This article begins with a contestable (but defensible) premise:  big data 
will revolutionize policing by offering new avenues to augment current 
investigation strategies.  These new tactics, while having a real cost to 
privacy, liberty, and autonomy, will also result in more targeted and 
efficient investigations, and thus will become incredibly attractive to 
police.14  
This article focuses on the distorting effects of big data policing.  By 
distortion, I mean that traditional understandings, language, and categories 
may become blurred by the rise of big data.15  Fortunately, the LEATPR 
Standards offer a mechanism to address some of these distorting effects, 
and with slight modification, can provide a clarifying lens to the problems 
arising from big data policing.   
Part I of this article sets out the promise and problems of big data.  Big 
data is revolutionizing policing, and this section explains the level and 
amount of data now available for law enforcement use.  In simple terms, 
information about individuals is being catalogued in unprecedented ways, 
including government and corporate tracking of public records, consumer 
purchases, financial data, and even health data.16  The aggregation of these 
different databases has the potential to allow personal dossiers to be created 
about each individual.  Such commercial dossiers are valuable investigatory 
tools, and once created, generate real privacy concerns.17  The promise of 
big data policing also means that in addition to continuing traditional 
investigatory database searches for known suspects, law enforcement will 
be able to use predictive analytics to discover unusual patterns that might 
signal criminal activity from currently unknown individuals.  This section 
seeks to demonstrate that the potential for this type of investigatory 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure 
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1724 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. 
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable 
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877-78 (2011). 
 12. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 2-5 (discussing the need for standards). 
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. See infra Part I.  
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part I.  
 17. Id.  
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technique is too promising to resist and that the LEATPR Standards must 
address mass, anonymous surveillance in a more sophisticated manner.   
Part II explores how the LEATPR Standards currently address access to 
these types of third party records.  While the LEATPR Standards 
adequately govern the traditional law enforcement practice of searching 
established third party databases for identified records, they present some 
problems in the era of big data.  This Part discusses three direct distortions 
of big data.  First, I argue that the amount and interconnectedness of the 
available data weakens legal standards like “relevance,” “reasonable 
suspicion,” and “probable cause,” which are predicated on a traditional 
model of limited, small data policing.18  This critique is an analysis of how 
big data affects the Fourth Amendment, but as the terminology of LEATPR 
Standards derives from Fourth Amendment doctrine, this critique also 
implicates the Standards.19  Second, I argue that the conception of “records” 
as envisioned in the LEATPR Standards becomes distorted in an era of 
blended, aggregated databases.  Information is no longer siloed in particular 
identifiable third party institutions, but regularly sold, merged, and 
incorporated into even larger datasets.20  In a merged dataset that includes 
highly private and nonprivate information, how does one know what level 
of justification is required to search?  While the LEATPR Standards 
suggest defaulting to the highest level of protection based on the highest 
level of privacy,21 this would prevent access to a significant amount of 
valuable data.  Third, I consider the problems arising from mass 
surveillance searches for suspicious activity in de-identified records.  These 
pattern matching searches raise concerns about how one can adequately 
protect de-identified data as well as larger issues of generalized mass 
surveillance.   
                                                                                                                 
 18. This is a subject I address in detail in Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and 
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394683.  
 19. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 6-9 (discussing influence of the Fourth 
Amendment on the Standards). 
 20. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal 
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 142 (2006) (“[M]ost types of personal information—
including names, birthdates, addresses, telephone numbers, clickstream data, travel details 
(flights, car rentals, hotels, train tickets) and transactional data (who bought what from 
whom, when, where, and how)—are unregulated, unless the data trader violates its own 
privacy policy, in which case the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can hold the company 
accountable for unfair trade practices.”). 
 21. See STANDARD 25-4.2 (“If a record contains different types of information, it should 
be afforded the level of protection appropriate for the most private type it contains.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/6
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Part III attempts to identify possible solutions to these gaps, with a 
specific focus on smoothing the distortions of big data.  The LEATPR 
Standards offer a valuable framework for analysis, and this section merely 
attempts to suggest some modifications to prepare the Standards for the 
future of big data.  The solutions focus on modifications to language in the 
Standards, addressing each area of weakness discussed in Part II.  
I. The Development of Big Data Policing  
Like many evolving industries, law enforcement has recognized the 
promise of big data.22  Police work involves gathering information about 
crimes and criminals, and big data offers a new tool to collect and analyze 
that information.23  The ability to sort through vast datasets, identify 
particular people or suspicious patterns, and catalogue the information for 
future use offers new ways to track and prevent crime.24  Much of our lives 
are being recorded through digital trails of information.25  What we buy, 
what we read, where we go, and where we live, work, and play are being 
recorded by private companies.26  Our interactions with government and 
public resources are being collected by public institutions.27  The innovation 
of big data is the recognition that those disparate pieces of information can 
be aggregated and studied in mega databases.  Powerful new computers, 
sophisticated algorithms, and cheap storage space have allowed massive 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 595; Robert Block, Requests for Corporate Data 
Multiply: Businesses Juggle Law-Enforcement Demands for Information About Customers, 
Suppliers, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2006, at A4; Bob Sullivan, Who’s Buying Cell Phone 
Records Online? Cops, MSNBC (June 20, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/. 
 23. Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information 
Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 447 
(2008); Andrea Peterson, Your Location History Is Like a Fingerprint. And Cops Can Get it 
Without a Warrant, WASH. POST, July 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/07/31/your-location-history-is-like-a-fingerprint-and-cops-can-get-it-with 
out-a-warrant/; Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods 
on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1. 
 24. Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1, available at 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/sizing-up-big-data-broadening-beyond-the-internet/. 
See generally MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4. 
 25. Hayley Tsukayama, Alarm on Hill over iPhone Location Tracking, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 22, 2011, at A13; Troy Wolverton, iSpy: Apple’s iPhones Can Track Users’ 
Movements, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_17 
893676. 
 26. Lohr, supra note 24. 
 27. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 442-43 (2008). 
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volumes of data to be useful for ordinary criminal investigations.28  This 
section briefly sets out how big data will change policing, focusing on two 
particular aspects of the change: (1) aggregation and personalization of data 
collection, and (2) predictive analytics.   
A. Aggregation and Personalization of Data Collection  
Databases and data mining have been around for years.29  Almost as soon 
as computers developed the capacity to store information, analysts have 
been seeking to use that information for their investigations. 
Data mining is the process of looking for new knowledge in 
existing data. The basic problem addressed by data mining is 
turning low-level data, usually too voluminous to understand, 
into higher forms (information or knowledge) that might be more 
compact (for example, a summary), more abstract (for example, 
a descriptive model), or more useful (for example, a predictive 
model).30     
The move to big data is, thus, a change of degree, not kind, for 
investigators.  But it is a significant change.31 
In part, this change arises because the amount of data has continued to 
increase.32  Every public record, criminal record, and financial record is 
collected by third party institutions.  Direct marketers know things about 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 240. 
 29. Cate, supra note 27, at 438 (“‘Data mining’ is defined in many different ways but is 
perhaps best understood as encompassing a wide spectrum of data-based activities ranging 
from ‘subject-based’ searches for information on specified individuals to ‘pattern-based’ 
searches for unusual or predetermined patterns of activities or relationships.”); Slobogin, 
supra note 6, at 317; see also Christopher Slobogin, Transactional Surveillance by the 
Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 144 (2005). 
 30. K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make 
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003). 
 31. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law:  Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 241, 246 (2013) (“‘Big Data’ is a nickname for enterprises that collect, 
analyze, package, and sell data, even uninteresting-looking data, to reveal tastes, habits, 
personality, and market behavior.  Big Data is challenging traditional privacies.”). 
 32. Larry Port, Disconnect from Tech, LEGAL MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 46, 49-50 
(“Google records every click of every search result, your Linkedln and Facebook profiles, 
including who you associate with, what products you like, and what entertainment you 
enjoy . . . . If you read books on a Kindle, Amazon knows what books you’re reading, what 
page you’re on in those books, and what you’ve deemed important via your highlights and 
bookmarks. Any online retailer where you have an account knows what you’ve browsed and 
bought.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/6
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our personal lives before our friends and families do.33  This growing 
amount of data includes government, consumer, financial, health, and 
internet records created by us (as users) and recorded by others about us.34   
The change is not just the volume, but also the interconnectedness of the 
information available in third party institutions.35  Linking disparate data 
sources into one easily searchable source has profound implications for the 
ease of studying human activity (and criminality).  New companies are 
creating new industries to buy, sell, and study our data.36  These data 
aggregators purchase information from private third party institutions and 
public record holders to create sophisticated consumer datasets for 
marketing, insurance, and other purposes.37   
A byproduct of enhanced technological capabilities is the ease 
with which data can be populated, aggregated, and exchanged 
across an increasingly diverse set of corporate interests.  These 
corporate interests span the economy and include retailers 
(Sears, Hallmark), pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer), 
technology firms (Microsoft, IBM), banks and financial services 
firms (Bank One, Bank of America), and automakers (GM, 
Toyota).  Data brokerage companies, such as Acxiom and 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html. 
 34. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 145 (“[A]dvances in data warehousing and data 
exchange technology in the financial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornucopia of 
transaction-related information that can reveal, among other things, ‘what products or 
services you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations you contribute 
to; . . . where, with whom, and when you travel; how you spend your leisure time; . . . 
whether you have unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even whether you participate in certain 
felonious activities.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 35. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 6, at 1185; Daniel J. Solove, Data 
Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343 (2008) [hereinafter 
Data Mining]. 
 36. Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. 
REV. 385, 389 (2012) (“Big data is closely linked both literally and by its scale to the 
massive datasets compiled by well know [sic] data aggregators such as ChoicePoint or 
Acxiom.  Those datasets often start by aggregating large (but not ‘big’) structured sets 
created by state, federal, and local governments, law enforcement, and financial institutions 
amongst others.  Acxiom is reported to hold data on five-hundred million consumers with an 
average of 1500 data points per data subject.”). 
 37. Allen, supra note 31, at 246; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an 
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1699, 1733 (2008). 
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LexisNexis repackage, augment, and sell personal data on 
individuals to corporate and public sector clients.38 
These private companies work with and sell information to law 
enforcement.39  In fact, law enforcement is an avid user of these 
commercial data collections.40  Adding to these private sources of 
information, the government’s own organically developed data mining 
projects supplement this privately collected data.41  The result is a valuable 
source of investigatory information which federal and state police have 
begun to use on a regular basis.42 
The aggregation of information allows for the targeting of particular 
identified individuals and groups.  For companies, the goal is an 
individualized dossier of information about particular persons, groups, and 
links among different persons.43  Yet, this same dossier also offers clues to 
law enforcement seeking information about particular suspects.  Since 
September 11, 2001, “[t]he DOJ, through the FBI, has been collecting 
telephone logs, banking records, and other personal information regarding 
thousands of Americans not only in connection with counterterrorism 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Kline, supra note 23, at 447. 
 39. See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 288.  
 40. See Gerry Smith, ATF Seeks ‘Massive’ Database for Faster Investigations, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/atf-database 
_n_3038271.html (“The federal agency tasked with regulating firearms wants a new weapon 
in its investigative arsenal: Big Data.  The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives is seeking proposals for ‘a massive online data repository system’ that could 
allow agents to make faster connections between suspects’ names, social security numbers, 
telephone numbers and utility bills . . . .”).  
 41. Cate, supra note 27, at 457 (“There are information aggregation businesses in the 
private sector that already combine personal data from thousands of private-sector sources 
and public records. . . . These records are updated daily by a steady stream of incoming data.  
They provide a one-stop-shop for the government when it wants access to personal data, and 
most of the government’s data mining initiatives depend on access to those data.”). 
 42. Id. at 444 (“The FBI aggregates data from multiple databases into its Investigative 
Data Warehouse (‘IDW’).  According to press briefings given by the FBI in 2006, the IDW 
contains more than 659 million records, which come from 50 FBI and outside government 
agency sources.  The system’s data mining tools are so sophisticated that they can handle 
many variations in names and other data, including up to twenty-nine variants of birth dates.  
The 13,000 agents and analysts who use the system average one million queries a month.”); 
Simpson, supra note 23, at A1. 
 43. Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral 
Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 562-63 (2012); Simmons, 
supra note 10, at 991. 
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efforts, but also in furtherance of ordinary law enforcement.”44  Public 
records have been digitized so our addresses, employment, criminal 
activities, and the like are available by a quick search using only a name or 
identifying number. 
Companies like Acxiom, Docusearch, ChoicePoint, and Oracle 
can provide the inquirer with a wide array of data about any of 
us, including basic demographic information, income, net worth, 
real property holdings, social security number, current and 
previous addresses, phone numbers and fax numbers, names of 
neighbors, driver records, license plate and VIN numbers, 
bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment, business and 
criminal records, bank account balances and activity, stock 
purchases, and credit card activity.45 
Law enforcement can, thus, quite quickly pull up information on 
individuals from computers in the police station.46  Creating a mosaic of 
public, consumer, and health information about criminal suspects is simply 
too useful for investigators not to take advantage of this new tool.  As one 
investigator stated, “Imagine the ability to instantly take a security camera 
photograph from a bank robbery and match it using a facial recognition 
algorithm to a photograph in an out-of-state motor vehicle database, and 
then to link that person’s name to a mobile phone from a private-sector 
marking database.”47  In the future, once these different sets of data are 
linked up, the result will be a very valuable integrated, individualized 
investigative dossier that raises obvious privacy concerns.48   
                                                                                                                 
 44. Slobogin, supra note 6, at 319-20. 
 45. Id. at 320.  
 46. See Cate, supra note 27, at 442-43 (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) 
maintains extensive databases in its Criminal Justice Information Services Division 
(‘CJISD’) that collect data from, and supply data to, a wide array of public- and private-
sector entities.”); see also The CJIS Division Turns 20, CJIS LINK, Mar. 2012, at 2, available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/march-2012/the-cjis-division-turns-20 (noting 
that transactions with the FBI’s CJISD National Crime Information Center totaled 2.7 billion 
searches in 2011). 
 47. Douglas Page, Crime Fighting’s Next Big Deal, OFFICER.COM (Sept. 9, 2012), http:// 
www.officer.com/article/10773317/crime-fightings-next-big-deal (quoting Philip Becnel, 
managing partner of Dinolt, Becnel & Wells Investigative Group). 
 48. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 251 (“Big data poses big privacy risks.  The 
harvesting of large sets of personal data and the use of state of the art analytics implicate 
growing privacy concerns.”). 
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These public-private databases pale in comparison to what information 
technology companies are learning about us from the internet and mobile 
devices.49  “Increasingly and of considerable importance going forward, big 
data comes from less structured sources including ‘[w]eb-browsing data 
trails, social network communications, sensor data and surveillance data.’  
Much of it is ‘exhaust data,’ or data created unintentionally as a byproduct 
of social networks, web searches, smartphones, and other online 
behaviors.”50  Google not only knows what you have bought, searched for, 
and viewed online, but also has the ability to figure out where you have 
been.51  Of course, should third party institutions like Google partner with 
credit card companies to know where you shop,52 police license plate 
readers to know where you drive,53 social media to know your habits,54 or 
commercial aggregators to know your consumer history,55 a rather complete 
personal dossier with all of your personal preferences and patterns could be 
created.  This information would then be potentially available to police 
investigating a particular person.56   
                                                                                                                 
 49. Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010, 
at W1. 
 50. Terry, supra note 36, at 389-90 (internal citations omitted).   
 51. Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of 
Google, National Security and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 
163-64 (2011). 
 52. MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 85 (“Globally in 2008, there were 90 billion to 
100 billion such transactions off line linkable to [point of sale] devices.  Law enforcement 
investigations regularly use such data to establish physical location.”). 
 53. Rushin, supra note 39, at 285-86 (“[Automatic License Plate Recognition] systems 
not only flag passing cars that match a criminal database, but they also record the exact time 
and location of all passing cars into a searchable database, whether or not there is any 
evidence of wrongdoing.  This data can be kept on file indefinitely.  In communities with 
extensive, integrated networks of ALPR cameras, this could potentially amount to mass 
surveillance of an entire community.”). 
 54. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 89-90 (recognizing the data available when we 
willingly join social networking programs, share geo-tagged photos, travel, use 
neighborhood guides, or a multitude of other everyday activities). 
 55. Kline, supra note 23, at 447-48. 
 56. See, e.g., Editorial, The End of Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at SR10; see 
also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 6, at 1138; Solove, Data Mining, supra 
note 35, at 343-44; Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1454; Andy Greenberg, U.S. Government Requests for Google 
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The LEATPR Standards recognize the new world of data collection.  
But, the next stage—the future of big data policing—will be when each of 
those datasets are linked together into large commercial databases that 
upend any ability to categorize the content of the data.  Traditional 
categories of “health records” or “financial records” will not be limited to a 
single dataset of that type of record, but blended with other types of 
information.   
For purposes of this article, the aggregation of disparate databases 
collecting public and private information on individuals offers two issues to 
study.  First, the types and sources of information included in these 
aggregated databases include all sorts of private and not-so-private 
information combined together.  Isolating the level of privacy in a particular 
database might be possible in single use databases (phone records, financial 
records, health records), but becomes more difficult in an aggregated 
dataset that includes portions of all of these types of records.  Second, 
commercial aggregators add a level of distance between the parties.  As 
Joshua Simmons has written, some third party institutions are best thought 
of as “Fourth Parties” who have no relationship to the data except that they 
purchased it.57  Unlike third parties who have some contractual relationship 
with the provider (i.e., phone company to phone consumer), these 
commercial purchasers of data possess the data simply as a commodity.58  
Finally, as a related concern, there is the technical reality that these Fourth 
Parties will soon be storing their data on cloud-computing systems hosted 
by yet another party (Fifth Parties?), which raises the question of whether 
this location also weakens the protections against law enforcement access.59  
After all, if police can ask the host for access to the information stored, why 
do they need to ask permission from the owner or custodian of the 
information? 
B. Aggregation and Prediction  
Aggregation of information also facilitates the creation of new 
prediction-based techniques to investigate crimes.  Pattern matching 
algorithms that flag suspicious consumer purchases (fertilizer to build 
bombs, pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine, etc.) allow police to 
spot (or prevent) crimes without any previous knowledge that the crime is 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Simmons, supra note 10, at 990. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Joshua Gruenspecht, Note, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for 
Information in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 548-49 (2011). 
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occurring.60  Predictive analytics have already been used to determine areas 
where crime may occur,61 but new predictive technologies will soon look to 
predict who will be committing those crimes.   
Third party records also allow law enforcement to recognize new 
patterns of criminal activities in the data.  Police can determine social 
connections or links, visualizing who a particular criminal’s associates 
might be.62  Police can create profiles of suspects by matching behavior 
patterns to repeated crimes63 or offender networks.64  Police can determine 
travel patterns and activities of known criminals.65  Police can determine 
the location of particular types of crimes, narrowed to particular geographic 
areas.66  This pattern matching thus shifts the focus of investigation from a 
reactive approach67 to a more forward-thinking, predictive approach that is 
all based on the accumulated data.68 
This type of predictive searching presents difficult issues that the 
LEATPR Standards will need to address.  The first involves the practice of 
generalized pattern matching searches conducted without any particularized 
suspicion.  As the LEATPR Standards suggest, such searches should only 
be allowed if the identifying information in the data is removed (or 
hidden).69  This process of making the identifying data anonymous offers 
one level of protection.  However, it is not a very fulsome protection, as de-
                                                                                                                 
 60. Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830 (2010). 
 61. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 
EMORY L. J. 259, 267 (2012). 
 62. Gareth Cook, Software Helps Police Draw Crime Links, BOS. GLOBE, July 17, 2003, 
at A1. 
 63. Vikas Grover, Richard Adderley, & Max Bramer, Review of Current Crime 
Prediction Techniques, in APPLICATIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XIV 
233 (Richard Ellis et al. eds., 2007). 
 64. Id. (“Data is not just a record of crimes, it also contains valuable information that 
could be used to link crime scenes based on the modus operandi (MO) of the offender(s), 
suggest which offenders may be responsible for the crime and also identify those offenders 
who work in teams (offender networks) . . . .”). 
 65. Murphy, supra note 60, at 830 (“But the use of databases to generate suspects 
represents a new kind of investigation altogether—whether based on particular information 
(e.g., ‘who called this number’) or upon predefined algorithms (e.g., ‘who has traveled to 
these three countries and bought these two items within a one month period’).”). 
 66. Bernhard Warner, Google Turns to Big Data to Unmask Human Traffickers, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-
04-10/google-turns-to-big-data-to-unmask-human-traffickers. 
 67. Cook, supra note 62, at A1; Sullivan, supra note 22. 
 68. Block, supra note 22, at A4.  
 69. See STANDARD 25-5.6.  
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identified data can easily be re-identified (either directly by requesting the 
identity of the target or through a process of connecting the dots with other 
data).70  In addition, as will be discussed in the next few sections, the 
traditional legal categories of protection (relevance, reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause) that might prevent police from re-identifying the 
individuals behind the suspicious patterns offer little protection in the era of 
big data. 
C. The Big Data Lure 
There is much more that could be said about how big data may affect law 
enforcement’s relationship with third party records.  The preceding brief 
summary seeks only to tease out some of the concerns that regulation of 
access to third party records must confront in a changing technological 
landscape.   
Before moving on with my analysis of how the LEATPR Standards may 
be affected by big data policing, it is important to acknowledge the 
incredible promise that big data offers law enforcement.  Big data is an 
important innovation because it offers novel solutions to age old problems.  
The move toward “smart-policing” or “data-driven policing” is not mere 
hype,71 but also recognition that many traditional police techniques lacked 
empirical support.72  In trusting the numbers, police departments have seen 
dramatic improvement in crime suppression.73  Whether this improvement 
is a direct result of the use of data is still an open question, but the 
correlation certainly exists.74 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 71. Although, in truth, there may be some measure of hype with these new technologies.  
See, e.g., Guy Adams, LAPD’s Sci-Fi Solution to Real Crime, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 11, 2012, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/lapds-scifi-solution-to-real-crime-6287 
800.html; Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1.   
 72. Nina Cope, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’: Integrating 
Volume Crime Analysis into Policing, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 188, 191 (2004); DAVID 
ALAN SKLANSKY, THE PERSISTENT PULL OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM 4 (Mar. 20011) (from a 
series of papers titled “New Perspectives in Policing,” published on behalf of the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government Executive Session on Policing & Public Safety, and  the 
National Institute of Justice.) 
 73. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastofsky & David Weisburd, Making Sense of 
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police 
Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 172 (2007). 
 74. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 3, at 70-72 (discussing how 
correlation may replace hypothesis in an era of big data).  
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In part, because this lure of big data is so great, those who study it must 
be vigilant in asking difficult questions.  Police will benefit from access to 
the data, and thus, they will seek ways to access it.  The LEATPR 
Standards acknowledge this reality and create a rather permissive process 
that generally allows law enforcement access.  The next Part assesses 
whether the reality of big data, by distorting some of the traditional legal 
protections, weakens the Standards too much.  Part III of this article will 
then seek to offer some suggestions in response to these concerns. 
II. The LEATPR Standards and Big Data 
The LEATPR Standards, of course, directly address the rise of 
centralized sources of personal information included in third party records.  
Necessarily, the “institutional third party” defined in Standard 25-1.1(e) 
contemplates private and corporate entities compiling personal data about 
individuals.75  The question, however, is whether the existing Standards 
accurately speak to the new world of commercial big data, aggregated data, 
and the valuable information in de-identified data searches.  This Part 
proceeds in three steps.  First, it examines how the chosen terminology in 
the Standards may become distorted by the availability of big data.  Second, 
it looks at the phenomenon of blended records that arise when corporate 
and other entities collect, aggregate, and merge various third party records 
into one large megadatabase.  Third, it discusses how the LEATPR 
Standards might apply to large scale predictive pattern searches used to 
identify unknown suspects and even unknown crimes from large de-
identified datasets.  This Part attempts to show that big data has a distorting 
effect, altering both the strength of the categories of protection and the 
ability to access the records available.  The point is not to criticize, but to 
refine the Standards in the face of these larger societal and technological 
changes brought on by big data. 
A. The LEATPR Standards and Language 
Central to the logic of the LEATPR Standards is the interrelation 
between the level of privacy associated with the categories of information76 
and the level of authorization needed to access that information.77  The 
chosen levels of authorization mirror well-established Fourth Amendment 
and criminal procedure terms of art—relevancy, reasonable suspicion, and 
                                                                                                                 
 75. See STANDARD 25-1.1(e).  
 76. See STANDARD 25-4.1. 
 77. See STANDARD 25-4.2. 
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probable cause.  Yet, one question that must be asked is whether these 
traditional categories of suspicion become distorted in an era of big data.  If 
so, the protection they seemingly (or traditionally) provide may not be 
sufficiently robust to protect individuals’ private information.    
In many cases, the LEATPR Standards provide a workable model to 
address basic law enforcement needs.  For traditional investigations, the 
categories of information (Standard 25-4.1) and the categories of protection 
(Standard 25-4.2) will be fairly easy to analyze.78  As set out in the 
examples section of the LEATPR Standards’ Introduction,79 if police are 
aware of a particular crime (a shooting in a park), their ability to search 
particular records of identified suspects (phone records, financial records) 
will turn on the level of privacy protection granted to those third party 
records.80  In the park-shooting example, obtaining the phone records of the 
9-1-1 caller, because of the “minimally private” nature of the call, would be 
permissible if supported by a statement that the evidence is relevant to an 
investigation.81   
The key is the term “relevant,” which brings up the first point of caution.  
The legal categories of protection—namely, the standards of relevancy, 
reasonable suspicion, and probable cause—become weakened in a world of 
big data.  What I seek to point out is that the LEATPR Standards’ chosen 
terminology, borrowed from Fourth Amendment doctrine, is less protective 
in application because the amount of aggregated, networked information 
now available distorts the analysis.  The next three subparts explain how 
more information makes it easier to meet these legal thresholds, and thus, 
easier to justify access to the information that is sought.   
1. Big Data Distortions of Relevancy 
Relevance is understood as perhaps the lowest threshold to obtain 
information.82  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if 
“it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See STANDARD 25-4.1, 25-4.2. 
 79. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 11. 
 80. See STANDARD 25-5.2, 25-5.3. 
 81. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 12-13 (discussing the privacy level of 
phone records in the 9-1-1 shooting hypothetical).   
 82. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345 (1985) (“[I]t is universally recognized 
that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in 
issue, but only have ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401)). 
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without the evidence.”83  In practice, there is little required to obtain 
information under such a low threshold.84  Courts routinely find information 
relevant.  Most recently, in the high profile case involving the relevance of 
the National Security Agency’s (NSA) access to volumes of telephone 
metadata, the reviewing court essentially held that the records were relevant 
because the government argued they were relevant.85   
Relevance makes its appearance in Standard 25-5.2(a)(iii), authorizing 
access to a record based on “a judicial determination that the record is 
relevant to an investigation,”86 or, in Standard 25-5.3(a)(iv), based on “a 
prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an investigation.”87  
In both situations, the category of justification (relevance) covers 
“moderately protected information” or “minimally protected information,” 
depending on whether the adopting jurisdiction chooses to require Standard 
25-5.3(a)(ii), 25-5.3(a)(iii), or 25-5.3(a)(iv) as its guide.88   
How does big data help expand the reach of relevancy?  First, the sheer 
amount of personal information available to search in third party records 
presents new opportunities for police to expand their searches about 
suspects.  There are simply more possible sources for which to search under 
a relevancy standard, because more information is available in big 
databases.  If police believe someone is selling drugs, all sorts of things 
might be “relevant” to that suspicion: financial records, travel patterns, 
associates, substance abuse issues or treatment, consumer purchases, phone 
calls, etc.  Many of these data points were simply not easily available to 
search before the advent of big data because they were not collected in 
widely accessible computer networks.  In addition, there is a qualitative 
                                                                                                                 
 83. FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”). 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 522 Fed. App’x 806, 810 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“Relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is a low standard . . . .”). 
 85. See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible 
Things From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991 (Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (“This Court recognizes that the concept of relevance here 
is in fact broad and amounts to a relatively low standard.  Where there is no requirement for 
specific and articulable facts or materiality, the government may meet the standard under 
Section 215 if it can demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought 
to be produced has some bearing on its investigations of the identified international terrorist 
organizations.”). 
 86. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii). 
 87. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iv). 
 88. See STANDARD 25-5.3(a). 
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change, as inference builds upon inference toward suspicion.  Information 
creates links, clues, and suspicions that, even if focused on innocent 
correlations, might suggest criminal activity.  If the target texted a known 
drug dealer, it could be an incriminating clue linking him to a conspiracy, 
or it could just be a contact with an old friend.  If the target parked outside a 
known drug house, it could be an incriminating clue proving his 
involvement in delivering drugs, or just a coincidence of geography.  But, 
under a relevance standard for investigation, these facts would be relevant 
to building a case.   
For example, assume that in the park-shooting example, the 9-1-1 caller 
was identified by a telephone number through call records.  Once identified, 
police could run the telephone number through national databases to find 
out a name, addresses, prior criminal records, prior arrests, and, most 
interestingly, if the phone number had previously been associated with gun 
violence.89  These datasets are not private and are under the government’s 
control.  Further, with a name and the connection to the shooting, police 
might be able to request more detailed information about the 9-1-1 caller on 
relevancy grounds.  A judge might sign off on a relevancy request to search 
databases that include minimally or moderately private information to see if 
the individual had any connection with the shooting (beyond being a 
witness).  A judge might also allow police to request twenty-four hours of 
geolocational data tracking the witness’ whereabouts.90  Or, simply because 
of the type of crime at issue, certain searches of consumer purchases might 
be considered relevant to the investigation.  Police might wish to access 
local companies’ sales receipts or the witness’ credit card receipts to see if 
the witness purchased the type of ammunition used in the shooting.  Again, 
this type of search for minimally or moderately private information would 
be relevant to investigate the shooting, even if it only happened to reveal 
innocent information. 
The questions get even harder in the context of mass searches.  
Continuing with the shooting example, assume police know that thirty 
people were present at the shooting.  Presumably, if every one of those 
thirty potential witnesses has a cell phone or a smartphone, it might be 
possible to identify all of the phones that were in the park when the 
                                                                                                                 
 89. See National Crime Information Center (NCIC), FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (June 2, 
2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm. 
 90. Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United 
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY, 803, 820 (2013) (applying the Standards to location data).  
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shooting occurred.91  Under the Standard 25-4.1 categories, the identifying 
numbers and names would only be minimally private and thus available 
with a Standard 25-4.2 relevancy showing.92  Therefore, without any 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the identity and whereabouts of thirty 
individuals will become known to investigating officers.  After all, what 
these witnesses know (or do not know) is relevant to the investigation.  This 
alone presents a slightly more concerning situation than the 9-1-1 caller 
who self-identified his whereabouts to the police.  People who have no 
association with the crime will be tracked to a particular place at a 
particular time without any individualized suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing. 
Mass surveillance without evidence of particularized criminal 
wrongdoing certainly raises Fourth Amendment questions.93  But, it also 
raises concerns under the LEATPR Standards.  Does a person’s mere 
presence in a park along with thirty other people at the time of a shooting 
make her personal information relevant to an investigation? Could police 
search law enforcement databases to find out if the telephone numbers 
correspond with a person in their police databases (or if the number is listed 
publicly)?  Could law enforcement search to see if any of these witnesses 
have a criminal record?  Could police search large data aggregators to find 
out if the names overlapped at all with the name of the victim 
(addresses/jobs/associations)?  Could they search other phone contacts to 
see if these numbers provide any connection or motive to the shooting?  
The answer to each of these questions is likely yes under the LEATPR 
Standards (since none of these are highly protected data sets).  Notice that 
by merely being proximate to a crime, the idea of relevancy has expanded 
to greater and greater access to personal information.  Add to that the 
phenomenon of “confirmation bias,” whereby individuals see what they 
expect to see, and police (unintentionally or intentionally) may create an 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Tsukayama, supra note 25, at A13; Sullivan, supra note 22; Wolverton, supra note 
25.  
 92. See STANDARD 25-4.1, 25.4-2. 
 93. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Should government 
someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will 
be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such 
surveillance as a search.”), abrogated by United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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ever-widening web of suspicion.94  In the hunt for suspicious links, many 
more things will appear suspicious.95   
One larger question for the LEATPR Standards might be whether the 
term “relevant” provides any real limitation at all.  If relevance is the only 
limitation, it seems likely that in practice the minimally-moderately 
protected and not protected categories will merge into one category of 
readily accessible information.  Simply stated, if police can conduct mass 
searches of location and identity based on any reported crime, then the 
relevancy standard is revealed to offer very little protection. 
2. Big Data Distortions of Reasonable Suspicion 
Reasonable suspicion is a well-established Fourth Amendment term of 
art, used in thousands of federal and state cases.96  In the LEATPR 
Standards, it has been adopted as one of the types of authorization for 
moderately private records.  Standard 25-5.2(a)(ii) requires “a judicial 
determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the information 
in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime,”97 and Standard 25-
5.3(a)(ii) connects that requirement to moderately private records.98 
The effect of big data is apparent in any analysis of reasonable suspicion.  
As I have explored in a separate article, reasonable suspicion is essentially a 
“small data doctrine.”99  From Terry v. Ohio onwards, reasonable suspicion 
has derived from cases involving police officers observing unknown 
suspects with little information about the suspect.100  These are small data 
observations.  And, as a doctrine built on cases involving unknown suspects 
with small data points about observable actions, the reasonable suspicion 
threshold makes sense.  But, as more information about the suspect is 
provided to the officer, the easier the reasonable suspicion threshold is to 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and 
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
315, 315 (2009). 
 95. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, 
J., concurring) (“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a 
badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime area.”). 
 96. A Westlaw search of “reasonable suspicion” in the same sentence as “Fourth 
Amendment” returns over 10,000 results.  
 97. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii). 
 98. See STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii). 
 99. Ferguson, supra note 18. 
 100. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968). 
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meet.101  This becomes apparent by looking at how the Supreme Court has 
evaluated particularized information in the totality of circumstances 
analysis.102  It can also be seen in how courts routinely find reasonable 
suspicion when more information about an identified suspect is added to the 
analysis.103  And, almost universally, in cases with “known suspects” there 
is a finding of reasonable suspicion.104  Simply put, the more information 
known about a suspect, the easier it is to justify a finding of reasonable 
suspicion.   
The move from small data to big data can be significant.  Big data—and 
the ability to know all sorts of personal details about the suspect—weakens 
the protections of reasonable suspicion.  An otherwise innocent observation 
of a parked car in a motel lot with out-of-state license plates can turn into 
reasonable suspicion if the license plate identifies the car’s owner as a 
suspected drug dealer who is listed in a database of known drug suspects.105  
Or, a man with a bag lurking outside a darkened home can give rise to 
reasonable suspicion if the suspect is in an area predicted to be 
burglarized.106  The suspect has done nothing different, but the suspicion 
changes because the officer has been able to obtain more contextualizing 
information.107   
                                                                                                                 
 101. As will be discussed, this is both because the information is particularized and 
individualized, mirroring the language in Terry, and because there is simply more 
information available.   
 102. Compare Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (holding that the information in 
an anonymous tip was not enough to create reasonable suspicion), with Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (finding an anonymous tip, coupled with further police 
investigation, provided enough to create reasonable suspicion). 
 103. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490 
U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Calderon, 681 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1997); State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1980); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d 
505, 510-511 (N.J. 1994).   
 105. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695. 
 106. Will Frampton, With New Software, Norcross Police Practice Predictive Policing, 
CBS ATLANTA (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cbsatlanta.com/story/23178208/with-new-
software-norcross-police-utilize-predictive-policing. 
 107. Again the phenomenon of confirmation bias plays a role here. Keith A. Findley, 
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) (“Confirmation bias means that police and 
prosecutors―as human beings―are likely, once they have identified a suspect or formed a 
theory of guilt, to seek confirming evidence and not seek disconfirming evidence. 
Accordingly, any ambiguous evidence is likely to be construed as incriminating, any 
incriminating evidence is likely to be viewed with heightened significance, and any 
inconsistent evidence is likely to be ignored or marginalized as insignificant or unreliable.”). 
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In addition, the number of data points can affect reasonable suspicion.  
Similar to the quantification argument with relevancy, sometimes the sheer 
quantity of facts can satisfy the totality of circumstances test even if those 
data points are otherwise innocent.108  Once an officer identifies the suspect, 
big data gives the officer access to a wealth of information with which to 
justify reasonable suspicion.  The point here is simply that the choice of 
“reasonable suspicion” terminology may not be as protective as it seems.   
Again, going back to our shooting example, to figure out if the 9-1-1 
caller was involved in the shooting, police may want to consider possible 
motives for the crime.  Police may wish to figure out if the 9-1-1 caller and 
the victim have any personal or business connections.  To establish (or rule 
out) a financial motive to the shooting (robbery, bad debts, etc.), police may 
wish to access the moderately protected financial records of the 9-1-1 caller 
(or any of the other witnesses) to see if a sum of money had been 
transferred.  To develop reasonable suspicion in a big data world, certain 
database searches could be conducted on mere relevancy grounds.109  Law 
enforcement searches could identify past addresses, employment, or other 
available records.  If any data showed a match between the victim and the 
suspect, this might establish a personal or business connection.  Data 
searches into stored automobile license plate readers might reveal the 
overlapping movements of the 9-1-1 caller and the victim.  If there was any 
geographical link, this might signify a personal connection.  If police 
suspected that the 9-1-1 caller was the shooter, consumer searches into past 
ammunition or gun purchases would certainly satisfy the relevancy 
standard, though possibly implicate only innocent conduct.  Aggregating 
these data points may well create reasonable suspicion to believe that other 
records may lead to evidence of a crime, which would allow even more 
invasive searches in other databases containing moderately private 
information.   
Again, notice that the 9-1-1 caller has not done anything more than 
report a crime.  Yet, police can develop (rightly or wrongly) reasonable 
suspicion based on connecting information (that may well be innocent).  
This is the reality of big data.  The more information gathered, the easier it 
is to generate suspicion.  As will be discussed, this weakness of the 
                                                                                                                 
 108. The Supreme Court has never adopted a numbers approach to reasonable suspicion, 
although in cases like United States v. Arvizu, the sheer number of factors, even if each 
factor was itself innocent, was found to be sufficient to find reasonable suspicion. 534 U.S. 
266, 277 (2002).  
 109. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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reasonable suspicion standard reveals a weakness in the LEATPR 
Standards that have adopted the same terminology.   
3. Big Data Distortions for Probable Cause 
Probable cause remains a constitutionally rooted threshold requirement 
that “exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”110  Under Standard 25-5.2, 
“a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the 
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime” is 
required for “highly protected information.”111   
Probable cause, as a term of art, may be the least affected by big data, 
because probable cause has always been a standard requiring significant 
information.  While big data provides more tools to collect this information, 
and likely makes the standard easier to meet, it does not fundamentally 
change the analysis.   
Take, for example, the seminal probable cause case Illinois v. Gates.112  
In Gates, police received an anonymous letter stating that Sue and Lance 
Gates were involved in distributing drugs.113  Further, the letter provided 
details about the Gates’ impending trip to Florida to retrieve the drugs and 
drive them back to Illinois.114  Police officers followed Mr. Gates and 
discovered that many of the plans detailed in the anonymous tip had in fact 
occurred.115  With this corroborated information, police officers requested a 
search warrant.116  In finding that police observations corroborated the 
anonymous tip, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of probable cause 
under a totality of circumstances test.117   
                                                                                                                 
 110. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)); see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) 
(“The test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’  
‘Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of 
the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.’  All we have required is the 
kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, 
act.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 111. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i), 25-5.3(a)(i). 
 112. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 113. Id. at 225. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 226. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 238. 
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Now, imagine Gates in an era of big data searches.  With the reasonable 
suspicion provided by the tip, police could have obtained financial 
information that might show a discrepancy in the amount of money earned 
and the family’s purchases.118  Police could obtain the past flight history of 
Mr. Gates who was apparently repeating this travel pattern with some 
frequency.119  Police could also obtain limited geolocational details of the 
Gates’ car, identify the visitors to the Gates’ Florida home (and determine 
whether they were known to be involved in the drug trade), or compare the 
phone numbers Gates called to known drug distributers, etc.  These data 
searches could well replace the corroboration provided by following Mr. 
Gates to Florida and could be done rather efficiently with a computer at the 
police station.  These facts would also likely support a claim of probable 
cause. 
This is not to say that big data changes the traditional probable cause 
analysis, except in that it makes it easier to reach the probable cause 
threshold.  New interconnected resources will be able to fill in the gaps of 
information and provide a seemingly stronger set of facts to base a finding 
of probable cause.120  New information sources will alter the probabilities 
that criminal activity is occurring.  Probable cause simply becomes more 
attainable with more information.   
The expansion of information sources may well be a positive innovation, 
as it also likely means that the probable cause established in many cases 
will be stronger.  The risk is merely that, just as in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis, quantity replaces quality under a totality of circumstances test.    
These distortions in the terminology suggest a possible corrective 
solution—namely, alter the terminology in the Standards to reflect the 
accurate protective scope envisioned by the drafters.  Probable cause, in 
fact, may be a more appropriate standard in a big data world that has eroded 
the justifications of lesser protections.  As will be discussed in Part III, 
these changes need not be major, but may be necessary.     
                                                                                                                 
 118. This financial information is likely moderately private information accessible under 
Standard 25-5.3(a)(ii). 
 119. This travel information may not be private at all.  See Susan Stellin, Security Check 
Now Starts Long Before You Fly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, at A1 (“The Transportation 
Security Administration is expanding its screening of passengers before they arrive at the 
airport by searching a wide array of government and private databases that can include 
records like car registrations and employment information.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 913, 913 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, Probability, Probable Cause, and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 63, 63 (2009), http://www.texaslrev. 
com/wp-content/uploads/Rosenthal-87-TLRSA-63.pdf. 
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B. The LEATPR Standards and Aggregation of Records 
Big data means big money because the information collected on 
consumers is valuable to companies.121  One of the realities of big data is 
that unique datasets are being aggregated into massive commercial and 
public databases.  This aggregation means that numerous types of highly 
private and nonprivate information are mingled in the same blended 
database.122  This change has the potential to fundamentally alter how we 
think of third party records.  In the future, centralized third party records 
filled with personalized information may exist as a commodity sold by data 
brokers making the records easily accessible to law enforcement and others 
who are willing to pay for the information.   
In many ways, the future is now, as commercial enterprises are collecting 
everything from private health information and financial credit reports, to 
more public interactions with law enforcement and government institutions.  
Data brokers represent merely the beginning of companies seeking to make 
a profit from merging all sorts of private and public information.123  
Facebook, Amazon, and other social media and commercial sites are 
already capitalizing on the highly personal information they know about 
users by selling it to marketers.124  This vast amount of information—easily 
searchable for all sorts of reasons—will only grow in sophistication.125  
                                                                                                                 
 121. John Furrier, Big Data Is Big Market and Big Business - $50 Billion Market by 
2017, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/siliconangle/2012/02/17/big-
data-is-big-market-big-business/ (announcing the Wikibon prediction that big data will be a 
$50 billion industry by the year 2017). 
 122. See supra Part I.A.  
 123. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-
what-data-brokers-know-about-you; see also Robert Epstein, Google’s Gotcha: Fifteen 
Ways Google Monitors You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 10, 2013), http://www. 
usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/05/10/15-ways-google-monitors-you (“Google uses your 
search history to send you personalized ads. That’s how it survives, after all. About 97 
percent of the company’s revenues are from advertising.”).  
 124. Kashmir Hill, Facebook Joins Forces with Data Brokers to Gain More Intel About 
Users for Ads, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/27/ 
facebook-joins-forces-with-data-brokers-to-gather-more-intel-about-users-for-ads/; Marcus 
Wohlsen, Amazon’s Next Big Business Is Selling You, WIRED MAG. (Oct. 16, 2012), http:// 
www.wired.com/business/2012/10/amazon-next-advertising-giant/.  
 125. Leslie Cauley, Google’s G1 Phone Makes It Easy to Track Surfing Habits, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/phones/2009-02-08-
google-g1-web-tracking-privacy_N.htm?csp=15; Epstein, supra note 123 (“Every search 
you conduct using Google’s ubiquitous search engine – for medical or mental health 
information, an update on your favorite mayoral candidate, the schedule of your church’s 
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Law enforcement can now purchase access to some commercial databases 
and aggregated datasets, and the resulting datasets which they can then 
search with a single query are becoming incredibly valuable for 
investigations.    
This aggregation of many third party institutions’ data, into what has 
been called “fourth party” aggregators,126 distorts the Standards in two 
ways.  First, it challenges the level of privacy that should be given to this 
aggregated megadatabase (which includes private and nonprivate 
information).  Second, it challenges the level of justification needed for 
access to these aggregated, blended records.  The LEATPR Standards 
recognize these problems.127  They suggest: “If different types of content 
are commingled in a single record, as will often be the case, then the 
protection afforded to that record should be dictated by the most private 
type of information contained therein.”128  But, taken seriously, that means 
that records of many of these fourth party institutions might be off limits to 
law enforcement without the highest level of justification.  Such a result is 
likely not the intended result of the drafters, but does arise because of the 
distortions of aggregated big data. 
1. Blended Privacy in Records 
The first issue is whether an aggregated, blended record (including 
highly private and nonprivate information) changes the level of privacy for 
the entire records dataset.  In other words, does the fact that a highly private 
record is included in a larger database of records distort the level of privacy 
under the Standards?  For purposes of this article, an aggregated, blended 
record is defined as the type of massive dataset collected by commercial 
companies whose central goal is to collect as much information about a 
person as possible. 
There are two reasons why aggregation might change the privacy 
analysis.  The first is that it might distort the meaning of “record.”  
Remember, the key to the LEATPR Standards is that one must first 
determine the appropriate level of privacy for the records at issue.129  But, 
                                                                                                                 
potluck dinner, how to handle kids’ tantrums, the cure for halitosis or the latest sex toys – 
allows the company to track your interests and, over time, build a detailed dossier that 
describes virtually every aspect of your character, food preferences, religious beliefs, 
medical problems, sexual inclinations, parenting challenges, political leanings and so on.”). 
 126. See Simmons, supra note 10. 
 127. See STANDARD 25-4.2(a) commentary. 
 128. Id.  
 129. STANDARD 25-4.2(a). 
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in an aggregated, blended dataset, what is the “record” for which you are 
determining privacy?   
For example, if a specific highly private health checklist necessary to get 
life insurance is combined with other less private information relevant to 
the insurance company, is the “record” the health checklist or the entire 
personal file with all of the information (health, financial, personal) owned 
by the insurance company?  If it is the former, then the privacy levels in the 
Standards work without much difficulty (the health checklist might be 
designated highly private, but other parts of the file would not be).  But, if 
the “record” is the entire dataset on the individual (the insurance records), 
then the record might not be clearly highly private and may include 
nonprivate information.  Said another way, if the individual’s insurance 
records are combined with financial, personal, or consumer information in 
one massive, aggregated database, is a query into that database (a) a single 
search of a single record (i.e., the entire composite file on the person), or (b) 
several different searches of different types of records? 
In terms of establishing what a “record” means, the LEATPR Standards 
offer the following definition: “A ‘record’ contains information, whether 
maintained in paper, electronic, or other form, that is linked, or is linkable 
through reasonable efforts, to an identifiable person.”130  This broad 
definition does not resolve the question of whether an aggregated, blended 
dataset is a single record or a series of records.  The specific health 
checklist, the complete life insurance file, and the other personal 
information are all linkable to an identified person, and thus all would be 
considered records under Standard 25-1.1(g). 
Of course, the term “records” is used hundreds of times throughout the 
LEATPR Standards and is understood to include both narrow and broad 
conceptions depending on the context.  If this is correct, then blended, 
aggregated datasets held by big data companies can be considered the type 
of “record” covered by the Standards.  But, the level of privacy in that 
single record that contains lots of different types of information is quite 
difficult to fathom.  As will be discussed in the next section, without a clear 
idea of the level of privacy in the aggregated dataset, the level of 
justification police need to access that information is quite difficult to 
determine.   
Second, there is the issue of commodification.  If I give my personal 
information to my insurance company in order to get health insurance, does 
the private nature of this information change when it is sold to a series of 
                                                                                                                 
 130. STANDARD 25-1.1(g). 
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larger data aggregators?  Or, in other words, does the commodification of 
my personal data change the level of privacy in that data?131  If dozens of 
drug companies not only know, but have purchased these highly private 
facts about my health, can I still claim that they are highly private?   
The LEATPR Standards provide a four factor test to determine the level 
of privacy in records.  This privacy level is determined by looking at 
whether  
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third 
party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in 
society or commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to 
freedom of speech and association; (b) such information is 
personal, including the extent to which it is intimate and likely to 
cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside 
of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is typically 
disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all; (c) 
such information is accessible to and accessed by non-
government person outside the institutional third party; and (d) 
existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows 
access to and dissemination of such information or of 
comparable information.132 
The first two factors are not affected by the commodification of data.  
The first factor focuses on the initial transfer of such information.  By 
definition, subsequent transfers (to fourth parties) should not alter the 
analysis.  The second factor seems to be referring to intimate information 
that is not usually disclosed outside a close social network by the individual 
person.  The transfer of information to additional third or fourth party 
aggregators would not affect this factor.   
The third and fourth factors, however, may be affected by the blending 
and selling of private data to commercial aggregators.  If information is 
sold or merged into large databases, the information will be accessible and 
accessed by additional institutional third parties.133  Thus, looking at the 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2057 (2004) (“[A] strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the 
United States, and individual Americans are already participating in the commodification of 
their personal data.”). 
 132. See STANDARD 25-4.1(a)-(d). 
 133. Angwin, supra note 49, at W1 (“Hidden inside Ashley Hayes-Beaty’s computer, a 
tiny file helps gather personal details about her, all to be put up for sale for a tenth of a 
penny.  The file consists of a single code—4c812db292272995e5416a323e79bd37—that 
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third factor, the act of selling the information to a fourth party aggregator 
(or fifth party, etc.) will cut against the claim of privacy under the 
definition, even though the individual identified in or linked to the private 
information has not done anything differently.  Perhaps this makes some 
sense.  If for example, the information about a person’s ill health (through 
insurance rates or premiums) is available in half a dozen commercial 
databases, then why should there not be a lessened sense of privacy?   
The fourth factor may also be affected because the laws that prevent 
institutional third parties from revealing information do not always reach 
fourth parties.134  Law enforcement agents may be restricted from obtaining 
consumer information directly from a drug store (without lawful authority), 
but they may be able to obtain the same information through a commercial 
aggregator (or direct marketer) that purchased the same information from 
the drug store.  Currently, the only regulation on law enforcement is on the 
direct access of the information, and not the commercial purchase of the 
same information.  Thus, the lack of law or regulation covering these big 
data collections may undermine a claim of privacy under the Standards.   
Commodification, thus, seems to affect two of the factors for evaluating 
the level of privacy.  As third party records become a more valuable 
commodity, this trading of information could affect the level of privacy in 
those records.  Finally, the financial reality that data is a commodity seems 
to undercut the sense that this information has a strong claim to privacy.  
Perhaps this is an insight best saved for another forum, but underlying the 
debate over privacy is the deeper question: Whose data is it?  If I buy goods 
from Apple and Amazon, is the data about those purchases mine or the 
companies’?135  If Amazon sells this information, why can I claim any 
privacy in it?  Perhaps, for business or reputation reasons, the company 
should not sell the information, but the question is could they?  If I 
regularly telephone a depression hotline number, is that information private 
such that my phone company cannot sell my name to a marketer of 
antidepressants?  Under the LEATPR Standards’ factors, both types of 
information would have some type of privacy protection, but the analysis 
seems to ignore that the particular third parties are commercial businesses 
                                                                                                                 
secretly identifies her as a 26-year-old female in Nashville, Tenn.  The code knows that her 
favorite movies include ‘The Princess Bride,’ ‘50 First Dates’ and ‘10 Things I Hate About 
You.’ It knows she enjoys the ‘Sex and the City’ series. It knows she browses entertainment 
news and likes to take quizzes.”). 
 134. Simmons, supra note 10, at 951.  
 135. Larry Downes, Privacy Panic Debate: Whose Data Is It?, CNET (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20057682-38.html.  
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who have an interest in maximizing their profits.  If it is the companies’ 
data as well as mine, why can they not sell it to the highest bidder including 
law enforcement agencies that want to use the information for criminal 
investigations?      
To be clear, these are not omissions in the Standards, but merely 
distortions that arise when personal information becomes a commodity and 
is blended by large big data companies owning multiple, integrated 
databases.    
2. Blending Justifications  
The second inquiry involves how to evaluate the level of justification 
needed to access a large, aggregated database.  Police are not always 
looking for a discrete fact in a database, but many times would like the 
entire composite picture.  If health insurance information (fairly private) is 
mixed with home purchases (not private), and financial records (some 
private, some not) are mixed with consumer purchases (some private, some 
not), how can a law enforcement agent calibrate the appropriate level of 
justification to search?   
The Standards suggest that the default is to require the level of 
justification for the most private information in the database.136  Under the 
LEATPR Standard 25-4.2(a), “[i]f a record contains different types of 
information, it should be afforded the level of protection appropriate for the 
most private type it contains.”137  Thus, if there was any highly private 
information in the dataset, the commercial aggregator could not be queried 
without a finding of probable cause.  This solution is simple in theory, but 
difficult to apply, and quite restrictive to law enforcement.   
First, the LEATPR Standards require law enforcement to know exactly 
what is in these large aggregated databases.  This presents a few practical 
problems.  The databases are proprietary, with companies unwilling to open 
their collections to public scrutiny.138  In addition, these datasets are 
constantly evolving, with companies being purchased, new datasets being 
collected, and new features integrated into the product line.139  There exists 
                                                                                                                 
 136. STANDARD 25-4.2(a). 
 137. Id. 
    138.  See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 
2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357, 386-87 (2006) (describing the different types of private companies 
that sell commercial data, including those that maintain proprietary databases).  
 139. See, e.g., Toby Anderson, LexisNexis Owner Reed Elseveir Buys ChoicePoint, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/2008-02-21-reed-
choicepoint_N.htm. 
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a real question of how a law enforcement agent (or legislature) can go about 
determining the requisite level of justification for these blended datasets 
without knowing precisely what information exists in the datasets.  The 
puzzle of these aggregated, blended datasets is that information is being 
collected so rapidly and being linked so easily that aggregators themselves 
could be offering highly protected information without even knowing it.    
Second, by requiring the highest level of justification to access records 
(if any highly private information exists in the blended record), the 
Standards create a disincentive for companies to build these datasets.  Big 
data businesses view accumulating and aggregating data as value added.  
The benefit of big data is mining these unexpected correlations that reveal 
patterns about particular people.140  Requiring data to be siloed into specific 
records and identified by privacy labels would thwart the development of 
these companies (or at least prevent law enforcement from using them).  
Perversely, the greater the aggregation of data into larger and more helpful 
datasets, the harder it would be for police to access the information under 
Standard 25-4.2.   
Finally, the practical effect of the default rule results in three suboptimal 
options for police. If a state adopted the Standards’ rule for blended records, 
police might: (a) not search these blended records; (b) wait for probable 
cause to develop; or (c) claim some form of ignorance about what is in the 
datasets and address claims of privacy violations at a later time.  None of 
these options cleanly allows police to gain the benefits of big data searches 
in the first instance.  Further, the analysis of what is highly protected is so 
complex (even in an isolated and defined record), that police may be 
reluctant to use these otherwise helpful datasets.   
Again, these problems are more a function of the nature of the big data 
environment than a fault of the LEATPR Standards, but they do make for a 
difficult application of the Standards to these large aggregated, blended 
datasets.    
  
                                                                                                                 
 140. For example, knowing someone bought cigarettes might show they are a smoker.  
Knowing someone bought cigarettes at a local bar at 2:00 am, might show they smoke and 
drink alcohol.  Knowing that they got into an accident at 3:00 am, might show that they 
crashed as a result of their evening activities.  Knowing that the accident occurred in an area 
known for drug dealing and prostitution might suggest involvement in other illicit activities.  
Knowing they were treated at a health clinic on Monday morning might further the suspicion 
of their activities.  Each fact alone is unrevealing, but together they demonstrate a pattern of 
dangerous activities that might be relevant to insurance companies, consumer marketers, and 
law enforcement.   
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C. The LEATPR Standards and Prediction 
Law enforcement has never been simply reactive to crime.141  Preventing 
crime, discovering ongoing crime, and deterring crime have always been a 
concern of police.142  The rise of big data policing offers new tools to 
discover criminal patterns and thus solve crimes.  And, critical to this 
change is access to third party information sources.   
One such law enforcement innovation allows police to use pattern 
matching techniques to identify suspicious criminal activity.143  For 
example, in order to manufacture illegal methamphetamine, dealers must 
purchase over the counter amphetamine products found in common cold 
medications.  Tracking the sales of those cold medications from particular 
stores reveals who is buying the raw ingredients for a deadly drug.144  This 
information about cold medicines is held by the third party institution (the 
drug store), and is both potentially relevant to a criminal investigation and 
yet also reveals private information about a person’s health.     
The LEATPR Standards directly address this concern in Standard 25-5.6, 
which involves de-identified records.  Under that provision, police with an 
official certification can obtain de-identified records from third party 
institutions.145  Thus, with the appropriate certification, police could obtain 
the sales of common cold medications at stores in a particular jurisdiction.  
                                                                                                                 
 141. Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 
437-39 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, A World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 39-41 (1991); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of 
Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 201 (2005). 
 142. A Nat’l Interoperable Broadband Network for Pub. Safety: Recent Devs. Before H. 
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th 
Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of William Bratton, Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t) (“Very 
soon, we will be moving to a Predictive Policing model where, by studying real time crime 
patterns, we can anticipate where a crime is likely to occur.”). 
 143. Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2005) (“Data mining’s computerized sifting of personal characteristics and behaviors 
(sometimes called ‘pattern matching’) is a more thorough, regular, and extensive version of 
criminal profiling, which has become both more widespread and more controversial in 
recent years. Profiling varies in how it is conducted, but often focuses on features such as 
age, gender, and race or ethnicity, sometimes coupled with behavior.”). 
 144. Jon Bardin, Kentucky Study Links Pseudophedrine Sales, Meth Busts, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/16/news/la-heb-kentucky-counties-
pseudophedrine-meth-busts-20121016 (“Using that data, researchers were able to determine 
how much of the drug was sold in each Kentucky county and compare it with the number of 
meth busts in local police logs. . . . In any given county, an increase in pseudophedrine sales 
of 13 grams per 100 people translated to an additional meth lab busted.”). 
 145. STANDARD 25-5.6. 
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The Standards further require that finding the identity of a de-identified 
record requires additional authorization under Standard 25-5.3.146  Thus, to 
discover the name of the person who purchased the cold medicine, the 
police would be required to meet the appropriate category of justification 
laid out in the Standards based on the level of privacy for the type of 
information sought.   
The problem with Standard 25-5.6 is that while protective of privacy in 
theory, it really offers little protection in practice.  Much has already been 
written about the straight-forward technological problems of keeping de-
identified records anonymous.147  Data scholars and curious individuals 
have taken to re-identifying previously de-identified data to demonstrate the 
lack of protections.148  Well-known companies such as Netflix and AOL 
have seen de-identified user information re-identified, generating 
unflattering news coverage and lawsuits.149  Health records have received 
                                                                                                                 
 146. STANDARD 25-5.3. 
 147. E.g., Schwartz & Solove, supra note 11, at 1854-55 (“In behavioral marketing, 
companies generally do not track individuals by name.  Instead, they use software to build 
personal profiles that exclude this item but that contain a wealth of details about each 
individual.  In lieu of a name, these personal profiles are associated with a single 
alphanumerical code that is placed on an individual’s computer to track their activity.  In one 
reported case, for example, the tracking file consisted of this string: 
‘4c812db292272995e5416a323e79bd37.’  These codes are used to decide which 
advertisements people see, as well as the kinds of products that are offered to them.” (citing 
Angwin, supra note 49, at W1)).  
 148. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 257 (“[O]ver the past few years, computer 
scientists have repeatedly shown that even anonymized data can typically be re-identified 
and associated with specific individuals.”); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in 
Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2013) (“The concept of k-anonymity originated 
with the work of Latanya Sweeney, who demonstrated, rather vividly, that birth date, zip 
code, and sex are enough to uniquely identify much of the U.S. population.” (citing Latanya 
Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. UNCERTAINTY, 
FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 557, 558 (2002))). 
 149. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 148, at 1118-20 (describing the Netflix re-identification 
problem and discussing the research of those who did the re-identification, including Arvind 
Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov); Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed 
for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1 (“[S]earch by search, click 
by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 became easier to discern.  There are queries 
for ‘landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,’ several people with the last name Arnold and ‘homes sold 
in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia.’  It did not take much investigating to 
follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., 
frequently researches her friends’ medical ailments and loves her three dogs.  ‘Those are my 
searches,’ she said, after a reporter read part of the list to her.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/6
2014]        BIG DATA DISTORTIONS 863 
 
 
the most attention, as the social utility of studying disease has been 
compromised by the ease with which the health data can be re-identified.150 
These stories and problems are acknowledged if not satisfactorily 
resolved in the LEATPR Standards.  The Commentary on Standard 25-5.6 
explicitly recognizes the dangers of de-identified data.151  The Standards 
reference Professor Paul Ohm’s resistance to the idea that de-identified data 
can ever be protected in a world of expanding, aggregated information 
sources.152  While other scholars have countered this pessimism by 
proposing methods to protect de-identified data,153 importantly the 
academic debate has not centered on law enforcement access to these 
records. 
In this way, the Standards may not fully address the dangers of police 
access to de-identified data.  Unlike academic researchers attempting to test 
the vulnerabilities of de-identified data, law enforcement analysts seeking 
to re-identify information have a particular and urgent goal in mind: solving 
a crime.  If a pattern emerges suggesting criminal activity in a de-identified 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Petitioners 
at 12,  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779) (“The PI data at issue 
in this case presents grave re-identification issues.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic 
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of 
the Petitioners at 24, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779) (“Patient [r]ecords are [a]t [r]isk 
of [b]eing [r]eidentified.”); Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative 
and Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 37 (2010) 
(“Personal information that no longer contains overt identifiers (name, identification 
number, e-mail address, telephone number) can still be linked with known individuals. 
Identity can be ascertained from simple, basic, widely available non-unique identifiers 
(sometimes called quasi-identifiers).”). 
 151. STANDARD 25-5.6 commentary.  
 152. STANDARD 25-1.1(g) commentary; see also Ohm, supra note 11, at 1746 (“The 
accretion problem is this: Once an adversary has linked two anonymized databases together, 
he can add the newly linked data to his collection of outside information and use it to help 
unlock other anonymized databases.  Success breeds further success.”); Schwartz & Solove, 
supra note 11, at 1847 (“In sum, whether information can be re-identified depends on 
technology and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-identified data with already-
identified data.  Moreover, as additional pieces of identified data become available, it 
becomes easier to link them to de-identified data because there are likely to be more data 
elements in common.”). 
 153. E.g., Andrew Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the 
Reidentification Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1417, 
1427-28 (2012) (proposing a differential privacy theory); Khaled El Emam et al., A 
Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2011, 
available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%C2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone. 
0028071; Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011). 
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source, then police have the ability (if not a duty) to investigate by trying to 
match other patterns from other data sources to identify the individual.  All 
of the methods of re-identification and all of the government resources can 
be brought to the case.  With enough effort, police should be able to match 
or surpass the abilities of academic researchers to re-identify data.   
In addition, in many cases, because of the other available third party 
data, police will not need to take the second step under the LEATPR 
Standards for direct re-identification.  Simply stated, once a suspicious 
pattern has been identified (be it unusual purchases, suspicious comments, 
or criminal associates), police can use indirect re-identification; police have 
enough other investigatory resources to re-identify the data without relying 
on the data itself.  For example, in our methamphetamine purchases 
example, police know from de-identified data that a particular person 
bought cold medicine from a particular store, at a particular time, and on a 
particular day.  While police could go through the direct re-identification 
process under the Standards to get the identity of the purchaser, police 
could also review store security tapes, speak with witnesses, track license 
plate reader records from the stores, or obtain other surveillance tapes for 
each of the times in question.154  Matching the images of who was at the 
stores at the correct time would also identify the suspect.  In addition, 
police could request the cell phone records of all the people in that store 
location at the time.  If a particular phone was in the store at the time of 
each of the purchases, police could use phone data to identify the 
purchaser.155  Then, police could either search police databases for the 
phone number, or if necessary, ask for a court order now that reasonable 
suspicion has been generated (since only one phone number matched the 
time and place of each of the suspicious purchases).   
The de-identified data offers other clues as well.  With a phone number 
(even de-identified), police can see who else called (or was called by) that 
number, thus generating a network of connections for individuals involved 
                                                                                                                 
 154. Don Babwin, Chicago Video Surveillance Gets Smarter, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 
2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-27-4171345706_x.htm; Cara 
Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A0; 
John Del Signore, NYPD Tightens Surveillance in Subway’s “Ring of Steel”, GOTHAMIST 
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://gothamist.com/2010/09/21/nypd_tightens_surveillance_in_subwa. 
php; David Gambacorta & Morgan Zalot, Surveillance Cameras Prove Helpful in Crime 
Probes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 2013, http://articles.philly.com/2013-02-01/news/366618 
95_1_surveillance-cameras-surveillance-network-high-crime-areas; Somini Sengupta, 
Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A1.  
 155. See Henderson, supra note 90, at 805-06 (discussing how the “high country bandits” 
were apprehended using cell phone surveillance techniques). 
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in possible illegal activity.  Those phone numbers (still de-identified) can 
then be run through law enforcement databases and re-identified to generate 
names and addresses.  Again, the identifying number allows police to 
search for all connections to that number, creating a matrix of the suspect’s 
associates.  The combination of direct re-identification technology and 
indirect re-identification through other law enforcement techniques means 
that much de-identified data can be re-identified by law enforcement.  
While this is not a negative result, it may call into question the protections 
built within the Standards, which seem to assume that de-identification of 
data is a substantial protection. 
III. Solutions: Smoothing the Distortions 
This Part offers possible solutions to the problems raised in this article.  
It focuses on three major questions discussed in Part II: (1) the problem of 
terminology in the Standards, (2) the problem of aggregation of blended 
records, and (3) the problem of de-identification.       
A. Problem of Terminology 
As discussed in Part II.A., the Standard’s chosen terminology offers little 
protection in a world of big data.  Specifically, relevance and reasonable 
suspicion, two already weak standards, are easily surmounted by the 
availability of personalized information that provides a vast quantity (if not 
quality) of data points and particularized information about a suspect.  
The solution, while perhaps frustrating to the drafters of the Standards 
(who no doubt thought carefully about the chosen language), seeks to 
ratchet up the protection by changing the terminology.  Essentially, I 
propose a one level shift, increasing the level of protection by one order.  
Thus, I would propose the following standards to replace the existing 
terminology: For nonprivate information held by third parties, I would 
require a relevance standard.  For minimally private information, I would 
require reasonable suspicion.  For moderately private information, I would 
require probable cause to believe the information in the record will lead to 
evidence of a crime.  For highly private information, I would require 
probable cause to believe that the information in the record will reveal 
criminal activity.   
These suggestions leave much of the Standards untouched.  The 
determination of the level of privacy of the information remains the same.  
The equivalence—central to the Standards (in terms of a relation between 
level of privacy and level of justification)—remains intact (even though the 
justifications themselves have been ratcheted up one degree).  And the 
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rationale for the levels of justification remains largely unchanged.  The 
more specific arguments for the changed standard are addressed in turn. 
Not Private Information.  Under the Standards, no justification is needed 
to access nonprivate information.  Under the proposed changes, a relevance 
justification would be required similar to Standard 25-5.3(b).  This would 
mean that police could not simply vacuum up all personal data, even if 
other private companies could do so.  This change requires police to justify 
why the information was relevant to an investigation.  Of course, as the 
relevance standard is quite low, this burden should not be difficult to 
overcome.  If the information is not relevant to a police investigation, police 
should not be collecting it for investigatory purposes.156  However, similar 
to Standard 25-5.3(b), this relevance justification could be met by a 
prosecutorial or agency subpoena without a court order.   
Minimally Private Information.  Under the current Standards, a relevance 
subpoena under Standard 25-5.2(b) is all that is required to obtain 
minimally private information.157  Under the proposed change, reasonable 
suspicion via a judicial order would be required.  Again, as demonstrated, 
because reasonable suspicion in a big data world is such an easily 
surmountable standard, this is not a significant burden.  Minimally private 
information is still quite revealing and to justify access to phone contact 
records or the like, police should have to determine that there is some 
particularized and individualized reason to obtain the information.  
Otherwise, fishing expeditions for data will result on a mass scale.   
Moderately Private Information.  Under the current Standards, 
moderately private information can be obtained in one of three ways: (1) a 
judicial determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the 
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of a crime158; (2) 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Such a suggestion runs counter to the well-established tradition that law 
enforcement should have access to the same records that ordinary citizens have access to on 
a regular basis.  For example, if a citizen can search my utility records in a jurisdiction that 
allows public access to such records, then the argument goes, police should have similar 
access.  See STANDARD 25-4.1(c) commentary.  The argument presented above would 
require police to meet a relevance requirement before accessing those same records, thus 
imposing an additional barrier to access.  While recognizing the imposition, the proposal 
above acknowledges that governmental access to personal data is different than individual 
access to that same data.  The government simply has more power than an individual, and 
thus checks should be built to inhibit governmental conduct as distinguished from individual 
access.    
 157. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).  
 158. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii).  
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a judicial determination that the record is relevant to an investigation159; or 
(3) a prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an 
investigation.160  These are rather low standards of protection.  Under my 
proposed change, these options would be replaced with a modified probable 
cause standard—“probable cause that the record will lead to evidence of a 
crime.”  This language comes directly from the current Standard 25-
5.2(a)(ii).  Notice that the language of the Standards does not require 
probable cause that “an offense has been or is being committed,”161 but only 
that the record “will lead to evidence of crime.”162  The Standards, thus, 
adopt a rather indirect requirement,163 which would allow judges to sign 
judicial orders several steps removed from actually uncovering the crime.  
This modified probable cause standard could be adopted to replace 25-
5.2(a)(ii)-(iv).   
Justifications for this change include that (1) the current standards are 
quite weak for moderately private information, and (2) the proposed 
language still provides a great deal of flexibility.  Many things will lead to 
evidence of a crime that may not be criminal themselves.  A review of bank 
transactions may suggest criminal activity without being criminal 
themselves.  It is illegal to steal money, but not to deposit stolen money.  
Similarly, long term GPS surveillance may lead to a connection with drug 
dealing (as in United States v. Jones),164 but may not itself demonstrate 
overt criminal activity.  By emphasizing the “will lead to” language, this 
proposed change ensures a measure of protection while still allowing police 
to obtain necessary information.   
Highly Private Information.  Under the current Standard 25-5.2(a)(i), a 
judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the 
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of a crime is 
required to obtain highly private information.165  Under the proposed 
                                                                                                                 
 159. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii).  
 160. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iv).  
 161. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). 
 162. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i). 
 163. The “will lead to evidence” language may however be interpreted to be a tougher 
standard than this author believes.  As Professor Slobogin mentioned at the Oklahoma Law 
Review Symposium, Nov. 15, 2013, the language could be interpreted to require a high 
standard of proof.  “Will” does not equate with “may” and thus “will lead to” could be 
understood to require a high level of justification.  See also Christopher Slobogin, Cause to 
Believe What?: The Importance of Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would 
Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 741 (2014). 
 164. 132 S. Ct. 945, 947-48 (2012).  
 165. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i).  
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change, the probable cause language would really be a probable cause 
standard—not that there is probable cause that the evidence will lead to 
evidence of a crime, but probable cause that the records will reveal criminal 
activity.  Specifically, the records must provide evidence of past or ongoing 
criminal activity or be usable in a prosecution for an identifiable criminal 
activity.  For highly private information, the standards should be equally 
high.     
The above suggestions, again, only seek a slight change in the LEATPR 
Standards to counteract the effect of big data.  The chosen terminology 
seeks to raise the level of protection without disturbing the underlying logic 
and proportionality reasoning of the existing Standards. 
B. Problem of Aggregation 
As discussed in Part II.B., the problem of blended records means that 
there are differing levels of privacy in these large aggregated datasets, 
which can no longer be identified by a single category of information.  This 
reality distorts the level of privacy and confuses the level of justification 
needed to access the records. 
The solution proposed runs counter to the default rule suggested in the 
LEAPTR Standards, but is more consistent with the big data environment.  
It acknowledges the reality that police do not necessarily know what 
information is included in the blended datasets, and thus, police cannot 
determine what level of privacy is required.  This confusion will result in 
officers either waiting until they generate the highest level of suspicion (on 
the chance that there might be highly private information), or forgoing these 
queries into aggregated, blended datasets.166   
The solution proposed allows broad access into these mixed datasets, but 
then requires police to establish minimization processes to guard against 
revelation of highly private information.  Minimization is a well-established 
concept in surveillance law.167  Essentially, investigators are required to 
                                                                                                                 
 166. See supra Part II.B. 
 167. E.g., Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could 
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 184 (2012) (“Minimization requirements are not a new 
idea.  They already play a privacy protective role in several other surveillance statutes, 
including the Wiretap Act, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005 (‘PATRIOT Act’), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (‘FISA’).”); Tene & 
Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 259 (“Through various iterations and formulations, data 
minimization has remained a fundamental principle of privacy law.  Organizations are 
required to limit the collection of personal data to the minimum extent necessary to obtain 
their legitimate goals.  Moreover, they are required to delete data that is no longer used for 
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ignore or shield information that they acquire that does not fit the categories 
of information they are justified in collecting.168  In addition, investigators 
are generally prohibited from sharing or using that information.169  
Minimization, thus, protects from unintentional disclosures and limits the 
use of the information for investigative purposes.  In wiretap surveillance, 
police must minimize content from individuals not identified in the wiretap 
warrant.170  In national security surveillance of overseas telephone calls, 
investigators must minimize content from U.S. citizens.171  If information is 
uncovered that is unrelated to the targeted justification, investigators may 
not use the information (subject to some exceptions, including a law 
enforcement exception).172  Minimization thus allows an overbroad search, 
with carefully designated protections to limit the information revealed.   
It must be acknowledged that traditional minimization analysis does not 
neatly map onto the blended records problem.  In a traditional minimization 
                                                                                                                 
the purposes for which they were collected and to implement restrictive policies with respect 
to the retention of personal data in identifiable form.”). 
 168. Wu, supra note 148, at 1173 (“Data minimization provides that ‘organizations 
should only collect PII (‘Personally Identifiable Information’) that is directly relevant and 
necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) and only retain PII for as long as is 
necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s).’” (quoting National Strategy for Trusted 
Identities in Cyberspace, WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 2011, at 45)). 
 169. Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data 
Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1413 (2012) (“Data minimization 
posits that holders of personal information should minimize the collection and use of 
personal information to protect privacy rights.”). 
 170. Id. (“Data minimization is an important principle in wiretap law, where the state 
gains lawful access to the relevant conversations, but should not use the existence of the 
wiretap to trawl through the rest of the conversations on a phone line.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
2518(5) (2012) (requiring that wiretaps “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the 
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”). 
 171. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)), requires “minimization” protocols to limit the 
collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to United States citizens.  See 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4). 
 172. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring minimization procedures); id. § 1801(h) 
(defining FISA minimization procedures); id. § 1801(h)(3) (detailing law enforcement 
exception); see also Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
269, 302 (2009) (“While minimization procedures are supposed to prevent the retention and 
dissemination of information that is not related to foreign intelligence, there are notable 
exceptions.  Under the minimization procedures, ‘information that is evidence of a crime 
which has been, is being, or is about to be committed’ can ‘be retained or disseminated for 
law enforcement purposes.’”). 
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situation, the targeted individual guides the limitation.173  A warrant might 
allow for all phone calls of a particular person to be recorded, with the 
understanding that other callers from that phone line would be protected by 
minimization standards.  Similarly, foreign nationals may be targeted for 
telephone surveillance with the understanding that U.S. citizens in 
communication with those individuals will be protected by minimization.  
Both of these hypotheticals share the commonality that the level of privacy 
is irrelevant when it comes to the targeted individual.  Police can obtain 
both highly private and nonprivate information about the target.  Only 
information about others (not the target) must be minimized.    
In the blended records context, one may also have this problem of 
revealing information about nontargeted individuals, but it is not the main 
concern.  The main problem is that with broad access to blended records 
police will see highly private information about the target without the 
appropriate justification.  In addition, police may be tempted to use that 
information to support their investigation.    
My minimization proposal seeks to address these concerns, but candidly 
only addresses the second issue of use.  I would suggest a minimization 
process that mirrors the categories of protection in the LEATPR Standard 
25-4.2.174  For aggregated, blended datasets, police would be allowed to 
access the dataset without the highest level of justification, but only able to 
retrieve and use information for the level of justification they had authority 
to access.  All other information would be minimized and not available for 
use as the basis of a justification for further investigation. 
For example, assume police suspect an individual of drug dealing.  
Assume they only have reasonable suspicion (not probable cause), 
preventing them from obtaining highly private information.  Police have 
access to a large commercial “big data” database that has aggregated and 
blended a host of available personal, financial, public, consumer, and health 
data.  Some of this data is highly private; some is not private.  Under the 
current LEATPR Standards, because there is some highly private 
information, police would need probable cause to access the records.  
Under my proposed modification, police would be able to search this data 
without probable cause, but only be able to use information that fell within 
the level of justification they possessed (reasonable suspicion).  Thus, in the 
                                                                                                                 
 173. United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1307 (1st Cir. 1987) (“This minimization 
requirement spotlights the interest in confining intrusions as narrowly as possible so as not to 
trench impermissibly upon the personal lives and privacy of wiretap targets and those who, 
often innocently, come into contact with such suspects.”). 
 174. See STANDARD 25-4-2(a). 
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search through the database, should highly private information about 
substance abuse, mental illness, or the like be revealed, police would be 
precluded from using that information in their investigation.  Of course, the 
police officers who conducted the search would be aware of the private 
facts, but protocols could be created to keep this information confidential.   
Such a minimization process would obviously turn on drafting 
appropriate protocols for protection.  These protocols would need to specify 
with clarity the types of information that would be allowed under each 
justification.  Such a categorization would be immensely difficult as a 
legislature would have to determine ex ante what type of content would fit 
in each category.  In addition, the police officer would also have to be able 
to determine with clarity what level of privacy the information contained.  
While perhaps the database companies themselves could use technology to 
sort, categorize, and code the level of privacy (making access to highly 
private information more difficult), the categorization process will be 
contested, contingent, and likely confused.   
The protocols would, however, precisely determine the limitations on 
use of this minimized data.  As with other minimization protocols, limiting 
the use and dissemination of the inappropriately obtained information 
provides a significant protection.  Usually, knowledge about a target (even 
highly private knowledge) has less of an impact than using that knowledge 
to further an investigation.  Protocols designed to restrict law enforcement 
use of the data could thus be effective protections within aggregated, 
blended datasets.  
C. Problem of De-Identification 
As discussed in Part II.C., the problem with de-identification involves 
the ease with which such data can be re-identified through direct 
technological or indirect third party surveillance means.  One solution is to 
allow access to de-identified records under Standard 25-5.6 only when there 
is no chance that the information can be re-identified. 
Currently, such a guarantee that de-identified data will remain 
anonymous is technologically impossible, meaning that in practice de-
identified records are not really de-identified and should be recognized as 
such.  Certainly, some companies have taken steps to reduce the possibility 
that de-identified information will be re-identified.  As one example, 
companies like StreetLight Data, which use de-identified GPS information 
to track human activity, have developed privacy policies which require that 
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all identifiable information be removed.175  The policies further require 
encrypted identifiers with no access to the decryption algorithms as well as 
aggregation into groups of fifteen or more so no individualized information 
is used.176  But, many times the information police wish to access in the de-
identified data will not be useful in that protected format.    
Thus, accepting the current technological reality, the de-identified 
records mentioned in Standard 25-5.6 are really misnamed.  Police 
requesting these records have access to re-identification procedures; 
therefore the records are merely disguised, not protected.  This reality 
should caution legislatures from adopting Standard 25-5.6 without 
additional protections.   
One protection would be to allow access to de-identified data only when 
police can provide the necessary level of justification for the type of privacy 
in the records.  Whereas before police had unlimited access to the de-
identified records, but had to justify (based on the appropriate level of 
privacy) particular access within those records, one proposal would be to 
require the same level of justification to do the initial search.  Thus, to 
access the de-identified drug store sales records, police would need to 
demonstrate the appropriate justification (i.e., relevance, reasonable 
suspicion) associated with the drug store records.  Then, to get additional 
access to re-identify a particular record, police would again need to 
demonstrate that same level of justification, but as to a particular record.  
This proposal, of course, would be restrictive to law enforcement, 
precluding many of the pattern-matching searches that look for anomalies 
in the data without any suspicion at all.177    
Another solution would be to adopt the current Standards, but simply ban 
police from using other indirect methods to de-identify the data.  If police 
wish to re-identify the person, the only recourse would be to use the 
protocols in the Standards.  Such a solution, preventing law enforcement 
from using available (and traditional) techniques to re-identify suspects has 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Privacy Policy, STREETLIGHT DATA, http://streetlightdata.com/privacy/ (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2014).  
 176. Id. 
 177. As a practical matter, this protection might allow police to conduct de-identified 
searches on the sale of pseudoephedrine because of its connection to the manufacture of 
illegal methamphetamine, but not to searches on the sale of Advil or other drugs not 
connected to a suspicion of illegal use.  In this way, some de-identified records would be 
allowed (if connected to a particularized criminal investigation), but large scale mass 
surveillance of third party records would be prohibited.   
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little to offer for its support, except that it does protect identities in de-
identified data. 
Finally, one could simply hope that the technology of de-identification 
solves the problems of re-identification. Technology may be created that 
allows truly de-identified data to stay anonymous.  This would of course 
allow the Standards to be used as originally designed.  Whether a 
technological fix can be envisioned, however, is beyond the scope of this 
article.   
IV. Conclusion 
Any prediction of how the LEATPR Standards will withstand the 
distortions of big data must begin with the fundamental question of the 
purpose of the Standards themselves.  My reading of the Standards is that 
they seek to regulate178 law enforcement access to personal information, but 
not necessarily affirmatively protect that information.  This distinction 
between regulation of police and protection of individuals has significant 
implications.  As discussed in the section entitled “Need for the Standards,” 
the drafters begin with the recognition that “[g]overnment access to third 
party records . . . is surely among the most important and common 
investigatory activities.”179  This is not to say that the Standards do not 
acknowledge the important interests of “privacy, freedom of expression, 
and social participation,”180 but only that the starting point seems to favor 
law enforcement access rather than personal privacy protections.181 
As demonstrated, big data policing compounds an already limited 
protection of personal information in the LEAPTR Standards.  The 
terminology chosen, the default rules, and the technological fixes may 
                                                                                                                 
 178. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 4-5 (“American norms of limited 
government and principles of freedom of speech and association thus require that law 
enforcement records access be regulated.”). 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. Id. at 5. 
 181. According to Professor Andy Taslitz, who was a member of the drafting committee:  
Law enforcement members were vehemently opposed to any justification 
requirement whatsoever, predicting that criminal investigations in serious cases 
would be rendered virtually impossible.  The judge, defense lawyers, and law 
professors on the drafting committee, however, saw some level of justification 
as essential to prevent governmental overreaching―to regulate, without 
prohibiting, legitimate law enforcement work.  
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Party Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839, 841-42 (2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
874 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:831 
 
 
not—upon analysis—be very protective in a big data era.  Thus, a 
deferential framework in a big data world may ultimately result in very 
little protection for personal data. 
In many ways, the emerging big data world may necessitate a stronger 
emphasis on protecting private information.  To create a balanced approach, 
consistent with the goal of law enforcement access but cognizant of privacy 
concerns of highly private information, the LEAPTR Standards may need 
to evolve with the technology.  The solutions proposed are neither complete 
nor comprehensive, but provide a starting point for discussion about this 
complex issue.  They offer some guidance about ways to improve the 
LEAPTR Standards in the face of big data’s distorting effects. 
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